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Since the early 1980s several statistical studies have addressed Malthus' claim against historical evidence from England. All combine E.
Anthony Wrigley and Roger Schofield's (1981) post-1540 demographic data with data on wheat prices or real wages. All find little if any impact of living standards on marriage rates (Lee 1981; Weir 1984; Bailey and Chambers 1993; Lee and Anderson 2001; Crafts and Mills 2009) . This paper uses new data on medieval and early modern marriages and finds, by contrast, that a strong positive check operated.
To reconstruct medieval marriages we look at the annual number of merchets-fines paid by an unfree peasant for the lord's permission for a daughter to marry-on the manors of the Bishops of Winchester from 1269 to the arrival of the Black Death in 1348. We find a strong connection between changes in wheat prices and subsequent changes in the number of merchets paid. For smaller merchets, corresponding to less wealthy tenants, the relationship is negative: higher wheat prices deter marriages; whereas for 2 Malthus did not envisage much of a role for the control of births within marriage, but this does not exclude a role for malnutrition-induced reductions in births. larger merchets the relationship is positive, suggesting that episodes of high food prices that forced indebted peasants to sell off their holdings created opportunities for children of wealthier families to acquire the land they needed in order to marry. For both groups, in other words, there is a strong connection between economic conditions and nuptiality.
For the period 1540 to 1800 we use Wrigley and Schofield's population data but, whereas all existing studies use their aggregate estimates, we look at total marriages and births in the 404 parishes on which they based their reconstitution. We find a strong impact of real wages on marriages by halfcentury up to 1800, whereas the impact of wages on birth rates rises in the early eighteenth century, but disappears in the late eighteenth century.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Part 1 reviews the limitations of data on merchets as a proxy for marriages. Part 2 employs data on marriage fines in southern and eastern England and asks what they tell us about the preventive check. We find what we consider rather strong evidence of the preventive check for the relatively poor but not so for the better-off. Part 3 returns to the issue of the preventive check in England between the mid-sixteenth century and the end of the eighteenth century.
Again it finds strong evidence of a preventive check. Part 4 concludes.
Merchets and Marriages
The merchet was a fine or tax paid by a dependent peasant for the lord's permission to marry a daughter.
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Several authors have cautioned against inferring marriage rates from merchets. Larry Poos and Richard Smith (1984) cite the implausibly the low marriage rate implied by the merchet data derived by Zvi Razi (1980) from the manorial records of Halesowen. Others have linked the tendency for the number of merchets to decrease over time to the collapse of the feudal system. There was a big falling off in the number of merchets processed by Spalding Priory after the 1390s and a similar pattern is evident in Sutton-inthe-Isle in Cambridgeshire (Jones 1998: 165; McGibbon Smith 2005) .
However, in Ramsey Abbey in the same county, the annual average number It was not a means of legitimizing marriage, since after the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) a valid marriage required just two consenting adults. Indeed, it is quite likely that the manor was uninterested in marriages between couples with little or no wealth because such marriages were unpromising sources of revenue. The merchet was more akin to a stamp duty, a means of controlling inheritance and taxing peasant wealth, so its size varied with the likely value of the dowry. In the manorial court rolls studied by Eleanor Searle the value of merchets ranged between 5s and £4 when there was land involved, but usually between 6d to 2s in cases where land was not mentioned. Few cottagers appear in the records paying merchets (Searle 1979) . 3 The demographic-historical literature on merchets includes May 1973; Searle 1979; Razi 1980; Bennett 1982; Brand et al. 1983; Poos and Smith 1994; Jones 1996 Jones , 1998 Mueller 1999 ; McGibbon Smith 2005. of merchets was higher in the first half of the fifteenth century than in the early fourteenth. 4 For two main reasons, then-selection bias problems for class and for period-merchets are an imperfect indicator of the total number of marriages. However, our focus here is not on the trend in marriages or the marriage rate, but on short-term variations in their number. As long as the likelihood of being recorded did not change erratically over time, the yearto-year movement in marriage fines may offer a rough guide-and no more than that-to the variation in marriages. On this basis, we have constructed an annual series of merchets paid on the sixty-five manors located on the estates of the bishopric of Winchester in southern England (Britnell 2003; Campbell 2003) . We also analyse movements in marriage fines from two locations in eastern England. Given that the payment of a marriage fine is almost invariably associated with land ownership, the number of marriage fines on a manor should equal or exceed the number of entry fines: if a couple marries and enters a holding the two will be equal, but the death of one spouse followed by remarriage of the survivor will cause marriages to exceed land transfers over the life cycle. In fact, the median number of merchets per inheritance fine was 0.8, with a correlation of 0.88 across manors, indicating the expected undercounting of marriages by merchets. [ Figure 1 about here]
The Preventive Check in the Middle Ages:
What factors determined marriage rates? The first, naturally, is real wages or food prices: in times when real wages fell, it took longer for couples to accumulate the target wealth felt necessary to independent to establish an independent household, so marriage rates should have fallen.
However, for wealthier families engaged in commercial agriculture, high food prices would be a boon, causing marriage to be accelerated. In addition, as high food prices caused indebted smallholders to sell their land, richer peasants would have had the opportunity to buy holdings to set their children up on.
The second factor is mortality: marriages rose as the widowed remarried, while the young inherited the property that would allow them to set up a household. For the manor of Halesowen, Razi (1980: 45-50) found that in years where 'mortality was high and many young villagers inherited land or husbands lost their wives, the number of marriages rose sharply ' (1980: 47) . However, Razi notes that the Great Famine of 1316-17 was exceptional in that 'although land was available and many husbands probably lost their wives, marriages had to be postponed ' (1980: 47) . The same failure of marriages to rise in 1316-17 can be seen in our Winchester data in Figure 1 .
In what follows we assume the following simple log-linear Malthusian model:
where M are annual marriages, N is population, w is the real wage, D are annual deaths, and X are other variables, such as technology, public charity, and urbanization. The right hand side variables are vectors of current and lagged values. Taking first differences we have:
We assume that the relevant population of tenants with holdings large enough to make them liable to pay marriage fines is roughly constant so ∆N = 0. This is broadly consistent with Figure 1 . For annual differences we assume that the impact of changes of other factors X is negligible: it makes sense for the change in marriages from one year to the next to be affected by a change in real wages, but hardly by better technology or urbanization, although these variables can exert a strong influence over longer periods.
We therefore estimate: Table 1 reports the results of regressing marriage fines on wheat prices and property transfers (the sum of inheritance taxes, sales, and intrafamily transfers) for the twenty largest manors from 1269, when records become reliable, to 1347, the year before the Black Death. All variables are differences of logs, so the coefficients are elasticities. The first column refers to all marriages, the second to those involving fines of 24d or less, and the third to fines of over 24d.
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It can be seen that a high number of marriages in one year results in lower marriages in the next two years. The overall effect of the price of wheat on marriages is negative. Note, however, that for larger fines the impact of lagged fines is marginally positive. The contemporaneous 5 Using a panel model where slopes were allowed to vary across manors did not alter the results substantially: these manors are concentrated in a small geographical area and represent a fairly homogeneous group of observations, in contrast to the parishes spread across England that we consider below.
elasticity was -0.1 for small fines and 0.01 for fines over 24d. The cumulative responses after a year were -0.21 and +0.23, respectively; after two years they were -0.54 for small fines and +0.40 for larger fines. 6 The cumulative estimate of -0.54 for poorer couples is strikingly high compared to those by Weir and others reported earlier for a later period. Table 1 also indicates that land transfers had no impact for smaller fines, but they had a large impact for larger fines.
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[ Tables 1 and 2 about here]
The negative impact of wheat price on marriages for smaller fines supports the standard preventive check story as outlined above: as real income fell it took longer to save to reach target wealth for marriage, and so marriage was postponed. The evidence on wealthier peasants is more consistent with the finding by Razi (1980: 47) whereby in the wake of years 6 Starting off with m t = θ 1 m t-1 + θ 2 m t-2 + φ 0 w t + φ 1 w t-1 -φ 2 w t-2 , the elasticities (η i , i = 0, … -2) are:
Then the cumulative elasticity after two periods is [η 0 + η 1 +η 2 ] 7 We also experimented with wheat yields but they produced coefficients that were small and insignificant. Similarly, multiplying yields by wheat prices to get a measure of the income of wealthier peasants who were producing grain for the market produced no meaningful results. of high wheat prices (which drove up the price of other grains also) laborers with plots too small to support themselves were plunged into debt, forcing them to sell their holdings to the rich. This gave some more prosperous landholders an opportunity to marry off their daughters. We measure deaths in the regression by inheritance fines. However, as Figure 1 shows, inheritances are strongly correlated with other property transfers and by using total transfers (the sum of inheritances, intra-family transfers, and sales) the fit is slightly improved. We therefore report results for total transfers here.
The outcome predicated by Malthus corresponded closely to the 'European marriage pattern' proposed by John Hajnal (Hajnal 1965) . Like
Malthus, Hajnal equated marriage with a couple's economic independence.
Since this involved the acquisition of both human and physical capital, marriage timing could be affected by economic shocks; marriage became 'a movable feast' (Wrigley et al. 1997: 125) . A series of poor harvests might delay a farmer's ability to pay a daughter's dowry or his son's ability to accumulate the savings necessary to set out on his own.
Exactly when England adopted Hajnal's marriage pattern is still unclear. married between the ages of 18 and 22' is hardly conclusive evidence in favour of early marriage (Razi 1980: 63 (Hallam 1985; Smith 1983 Smith , 1999 Goldberg 2006: 426-27; Razi 1980: 60-64; Bailey 1996) .
Even less is known about mean marriage age in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. By the early seventeenth century mean ages at first marriage were over 27 years for men and 25 years for women (Wrigley et al. 1997: 134). fines, since such individuals were likely to have been net producers of grain and beneficiaries of forced land sales by the poor. Thus high prices could 9 Razi also proposed an alternative merchet series which attempted to correct for missing evidence, but since this did not yield better results, the outcome is not reported here.
Property Transfers:
have enhanced the marriage opportunities of those who with purchasing power to spare.
[ Table 3 about here]
Post-1541: Marriages
As noted in the introduction, several previous studies have addressed the link between marriages, births, and living standards in early modern
England. Those studies rely exclusively on the aggregate demographic data published in Wrigley and Schofield (1981) . Our approach here differs in that it applies multi-level regression analysis to the 404 individual parishes constituting the Cambridge Group database for five sub-periods from 1539-1600 to 1751-1800, as in an earlier study of the impact of living standards on deaths (Kelly and Ó Gráda 2010) . This increases the number of observations considerably, and allows us to see how marriage patterns varied across parishes. Coverage improves over time, as the proportion of parishes with the relevant records intact rises. In the absence of long-run data on regional wages, living standards are proxied by the national real wage series for agricultural laborers provided by Clark (2007) . As above, variables are in differences of logs so that the estimated coefficients may be interpreted as elasticities.
Because we have data for individual parishes we can estimate a multilevel regression, allowing the impact of wages and past marriages to vary across parishes:
where the vector of random effects across parishes β j = (β′ 1j, β′ 2j )′ ∼ N(0, Σβ j ) (Bates 2010 ).
The outcome in Table 3 shows that current wages and wages lagged one and two years had a very strong impact on marriages throughout. The cumulative responses of marriages up to three lags are reported in Table 4 .
Before 1700 the cumulative impact peaked one year later; thereafter the peak occurred two years later. Overall, the short-term response was strongest in 1650-1699, but the high cumulative impact in 1700-1749
corroborates our earlier finding that this was a challenging half-century in demographic terms. Deaths, by contrast to the medieval data, had virtually no impact on marriages. This may reflect greater economic opportunities, or simply the fact the medieval data are restricted to moderately prosperous farming households whereas the later data include all marriages.
The preventive check is a good deal stronger than that found in earlier studies based on national totals. Weir (1984) estimated the cumulative responses of marriages to wheat price at +0.099 in 1640-1739 and -0.113 in 1740-49; the cumulative responses of fertility were -0.050 and -0.164, respectively. Bailey and Chambers (1993: 357-358) , using the real wage series constructed by Henry Phelps Brown and Sheila Hopkins (1961) rather than wheat prices, reported elasticities of births to real wages at between 0.2 to 0.3 and elasticities of the marriage rate at roughly half that for sub-periods between 1542 and 1800. Nicholas Crafts and Terence Mills (2009), using Clark's real wage data and state space techniques, could find no evidence for the preventive check after the mid-seventeenth century.
All told, these estimates imply a rather weak preventive check; indeed, Weir (1984: 43) was struck by how 'at no time between 1670 and 1830 were marriages less responsive to economic shocks in France than in England'.
[ Tables 4 and 5 about here]
Post-1541: Births
The outcome for births, described in Table 5 , resembles that for marriages. The impact of variations in real wages on births before 1750 was quite powerful. The cumulative impact, described in Table 6 The new evidence produced in this paper strengthens the case for the preventive check in both medieval and early modern England. Our reliance on merchets as a proxy for tracking short-run fluctuations in marriages in the medieval era is open to criticism, but the outcome can be defended as coherent. Its implication of the presence of a preventive check on marriages for poorer tenants is plausible, and its tentative finding that better-off tenants may have benefited from poor harvests interesting. Our analysis of the post-1540 period is based on the same data as previous analyses, but our study differs in that employs that data at parish level rather than in aggregate. The outcome offers rather clear-cut evidence of a stronger preventive check on marriages and births than found in those studies using aggregate data. Our next step is to discover how the strength of the check varied by socio-economic status. 
